Tuesday, 25 March 2008

Where's Wally?

I haven't joined a cult or otherwise gained or lost faith, I've been mostly in The Real World™ for the last few weeks. I am renovating a house and, irritatingly, it won't rebuild itself. When I have mollycoddled the walls into standing unaided, I will put my thinking hat back on. Until then, I am in overalls and wielding a cold chisel.

Friday, 29 February 2008

Is there an answer? Part 2.

I got a bit diverted by the comments for Part 1, and may have to just cut'n'paste some of that discussion into this new post as I covered a lot of what I was going to say.

I'm still pretty happy with the claim that the Universe does not need to "make sense" or adhere to a strict set of rules. We observe order in the Universe, and scientific models need order, and for scientific models to be useful they need to match with observation of the Universe to a reasonable degree, but that does not imply that the Universe itself requires order.

(that may be the worst sentence I've ever written ... perhaps I need some revolting instant coffee)

So why bother attempting to argue something that culminates in such an ugly sentence? Because the requirement of order is one of the premises behind one of the most common arguments for the necessary existence of a creator. And the old testament God is defined to be such a creator.

The argument goes something like this (cut'n'paste):
  • order requires a designer
  • the universe requires order

therefore:

  • the universe requires a designer

The second premise is often expressed in empirical a posteriori terms as "the universe appears to have order", in which case the first premise should also be expressed in empirical terms as "order appears to require a designer" and would lead to an empirical thesis of "the universe appears to require a designer". This is quite interesting in itself and may even warrant a "Part 3". It falls down quite rapidly, however, since science has shown that lots of the apparent order in the Universe does not appear to require a designer at all and is perfectly well explained by random, un-designed events.

If we take the argument in a priori terms, rather than empirical terms, then the second assumption "the universe requires order" seems fairly arbitrary. Scientific models require order ... almost by definition. I genuinely cannot see why the same definition should apply to the Universe.

Tuesday, 26 February 2008

Question 6: Is there an answer? Part One.

Disclaimer: this post threatens to meander deep into the territory of bitter instant coffee and meagre jazz cigarettes.

Ages ago I said that science is all about the models, not about absolute truth. A scientific model is one thing, the thing that it models is quite another. It's not a case of "never the twain shall meet", but they are very definitely distinct.

I would argue that one absolutely crucial distinction is that models necessarily make sense. They have order and logic and they are predictable and clear and useful. (Obviously, the clarity of a particular model may depend on one's expertise in the area and the size of one's brain). If a model is not all these things then it is a poor model.

The same is not necessarily true of the thing being modelled. There is no obligation on the observable universe to 'make sense'. The universe does not need to have an "answer" in order for it to exist. Even if the human race, or any other sentient entity in the universe, never figures out exactly what the universe is and how it works, that won't stop the universe from existing.

Here is where it gets a little "instant coffee" ... apologies in advance if I accidentally use the word 'teleological' at any point. I like the word a lot more than the concept.

The human brain has evolved to cope with our environment. One way it does this is by creating simplified models of the outside world to allow us to predict the way the world works. The outside world is much too complicated to analyse in precise detail at every step. Every tree is different, but the brain can filter out the differences and recognise a tree as a tree. Conversely, every human face is remarkably similar, but the brain can easily tell them apart. These are capabilities that we take for granted, but, when you analyse them, they're pretty remarkable. The brain, in effect, superimposes simpler and more useful models and does its "thinking" with these models rather than with what it directly observes of the world. It is a cheat, but it means we don't have to carry our brains around in wheelbarrows. And it means if we have ten boxes of ten apples each, we don't need to count every single apple to know we have a hundred apples.

Science is an extension of this natural talent. We have re-used our capacity to form intuitive models of our immediate environment in order to form more and more abstract models of the universe. But the origin of these models and this method is our brain and its method of dealing with the outside world.

This is not to suggest that all our models "make sense" purely because we invented them. There is apparent order in the world. When we compare our models with the observable universe, they match to a very useful degree. But they never match exactly. And we can conceive of things within these "simple" models that do not (and cannot) exist in the "real" universe ... infinite numbers, perfect Platonic solids, the humble pi.

Plato himself found this a bit of a headache, and his brain probably did need carrying around in a wheelbarrow. Keen readers may want to read (or read up on) Plato's Republic and the allegory of the cave. Very keen readers may want to have a look at some Hume too. (I studied philosophy at a Scottish University so I may be recommending Hume in order to spread the pain ... but I would like to think it's more generous than that)

Stumbling finally to my point: we cannot argue that the the fact that the Universe "makes sense" means that we require a knowing creator because the Universe does not necessarily make any sort of sense at all. There is no necessity for an answer so there is no necessity for an entity asking the question.

There ... and I didn't mention Telly Savalas once.

Monday, 18 February 2008

Question 5: Good luck or good management? Part Three.

A quick summary of parts one and two.

(I could pretend this is for the benefit of the reader but it is mainly because I've been very lazy updating the blog and need to remind myself what I'm talking about)

Important point number one: You cannot dismiss a model on subjective grounds. A model is not less valid because you (or any number of other people) do not like it. A model is not less valid because it contradicts a piece of dogma or accepted wisdom. A model is not less valid because it appears to be complicated. A model is not less valid because it appears counter intuitive.

Important point number two: The scientific method is objective and is open to everybody. There is no grand conspiracy within 'science' to exclude particular beliefs or ideas. The criteria for a scientific model are objective and do not depend upon the prejudices of the existing scientific community. If a model can be clearly expressed and can be tested then it is, in the broadest sense of the term, science. If the model is useful (by my slightly non-standard definition of the term) then it is good science.

Good luck or good management?

Back to the post title and back even further to my earlier definition of God.

One of the fundamental characteristics of God is the role of creator. The assertion of the Old Testament is that, in some sense and to some degree, everything that currently exists was created by God. I want to avoid a discussion of the interpretation of Genesis and the specifics of how and when that creation took place and examine whether it is possible to prove or disprove the role in more general terms. Is there a role in our understanding of the observable universe that requires a conscious creator?

An aside on simplicity: in Important Point 1, I dismissed the idea that simplicity should be a guide to the validity of a model, but I'll dip into it briefly anyway. I'm nothing if not inconsistent. A seemingly simple explanation for any complicated observation is "God did it". It is certainly short and pithy, but that is not the same as simple. The explanation "God did it" is only simple if we assume a priori that God exists. If you do not make this assumption, then the explanation for something complicated becomes "Something even more complicated did it." Which is hardly satisfactory. If you combine it with the common reasoning that God must exist because complicated and amazing things exist, then the argument becomes circular: How do you explain the complexity of the universe? God did it. How do you know God exists? Because the universe is complicated.

A conscious creator in science.

None of the current set of models for how we came to be here include a role for a conscious creator. The model of natural selection does not require any intelligent and deliberate input to explain the evolution of the current gamut of life on earth. The stars and planets do not require a conscious hand to explain their positions and movements. To my knowledge, there is no common scientific model for anything that requires a creator.

This is not a concerted and deliberate omission; science has arrived, over the course of a couple of centuries of subjective application of an objective method, at a set of models that simply do not require a creator. There is no gap in the models that can be usefully and testably filled by a creator. The models do not match with observation better if you include a creator somewhere within them.

Now ... science does not know everything. But it can, in principle, model anything, and everything that science has currently modelled works perfectly well without a creator. There is no evidence and, more importantly, no need for a creator.

We are here, to the very best of our understanding, entirely by accident.

Wednesday, 6 February 2008

Lemma 3: science is objective

I made the distinction in the previous post between 'subjective' and 'objective' when judging the merit of an idea. A valid question is whether a judgement made by humans can ever be truly objective. Humans are fallible and they have selfish agendas and moral beliefs and all manner of prejudices and tastes. An individual scientist can clearly make errors of judgement and can be influenced by his or her own beliefs. Why does an assertion that has been scientifically tested have more value than one that has not?

The answer is in the title. Individual scientists are not necessarily objective, but science and the scientific method are. There is no magic to the scientific method: you come up with an idea, you present that idea in an understandable and testable form, you test the idea against observation and you allow anybody else in the world to test it as well. Science is a group activity open to anybody who has the capacity to learn the language and the methods. There are no sacred cows: any idea can be challenged.

Now ... the scientific community (like society in general) is fairly conservative. When somebody comes along with an observation or a model that challenges the current consensus, it will be greeted with scepticism. But the history of science contains a huge number of minor and major revolutions. Better ideas always win in the end. Our current model of the universe is quite clearly better than it was a century ago.

A conspiracy theorist could argue that the entire scientific community is either deliberately or accidentally misleading itself. But there is nothing unique about scientists and nothing in the scientific method to exclude a specific group or belief. This argument is essentially saying that the entire human race is misleading itself. If you think that science has made a grave mistake, then politely knock on the door and put them right. Copernicus did it. Einstein did it. It is not a closed shop.

Are scientists 100% objective? No. Is every scientific conclusion 100% objective? No.

Are ideas that have been posed and tested via the scientific method more objective than those that have not: absolutely yes.

Thursday, 31 January 2008

Question 5: Good luck or good management? Part Two.

In part one I argued that you cannot dismiss a model because it feels unlikely, and you cannot choose one model over another purely on the grounds that it appears less complicated. Something does not become a valid explanation simply because you like it and want it to be true. The observable behaviour of the universe is not subject to human whims and tastes.

(note: the observable behaviour of the universe is subject to human fallibility, see
Observer Effect. Quite often the mere act of observing something has an effect on its behaviour. More on that when I get back to omniscience ... just in case Robin is about to pre-empt me again.)

To decide the value of a model you have to objectively test it. The model has to make useful predictions that can be tested against observation. This is an absolutely critical step in the scientific method: your ideas must be expressed in such a way that other people can test them and demonstrate that they do not work. One of the primary reasons for publishing a scientific model is to allow your peers to explain why it is rubbish and, hopefully, propose an alternative and better model in its place.



"The earth is the centre of the universe."


The Geocentric Model (the idea that the earth is a sphere at the centre of the universe and everything else revolves around it) was essentially the first scientific model for how the universe works. It matches quite well with casual observation: the earth does not feel like it is moving and the sun and the moon and the stars appear to revolve around it. Unfortunately, it does not match with closer examination: if you accurately map the position of the stars and planets in the sky, they do not move in the way that a geocentric model predicts they should.

The ancient Greeks and later astronomers dedicated a great deal of effort to modifying and elaborating on the geocentric idea to create a model that did accurately predict the movements of the heavens. Unfortunately, they were hampered by a single assumption: the earth is the centre of the universe. It was only when Copernicus dared to suggest that this assumption was false and that
the earth was actually revolving around the sun that a simple model suddenly started to match observation. This led to a fairly dramatic conflict between the scientific method and doctrine: according to the scientific method this was a useful and accurate model of the universe, but according to common belief (and Christian dogma) this was heresy.

Science has since established that not only is the Earth not the immovable centre of the Universe, neither is our Sun, or even our galaxy. In fact, a conventional idea of an immovable centre of the universe may not even make sense.

"Space and Time are absolute"


Isaac Newton came up with a set of models for how objects interact (laws of motion and gravity) that formed the basis of classical mechanics. It is impossible to overstate just how clever Newton was and how important these theories are: very very very. Unfortunately, as in the geocentric model, Newton's model makes some assumptions that mean it is only useful in particular contexts (wiki link not necessarily for the faint hearted). As I claimed earlier, this does not make the model 'false', it just puts limits on when it can be used. It is still very very very useful.

Towards the end of the 19th Century, scientists began to make measurements that did not quite match with the predictions of Newton's model. In the early 20th Century, Einstein proposed alternative models (Special and subsequently General Relativity) that better matched the new observations. In this instance, Newton's model was not supported by quite such a firm religious doctrine as the geocentric model, but there was still some resistance. Newton's model is more intuitive and it had been around for a long time. People liked it. But (how hard can I bang this particular drum?) the value of a model is not measured by subjective popularity, it is measured by objective testing. At large scales and great speeds, the predictions made by Einstein's model are objectively more accurate than those made by Newton's model. The scientific method insists that you choose the better model for the job.

(note: there were, and still are, dogmatic objections to Relativity, but they are not anywhere near comparable in scale to the objections to Copernicus' suggestion that the earth revolves around the sun)

Final bang of the drum: the scientific method does not care what people like or what existing doctrine or tradition says. A model is only as good as the evidence that supports it. Badum tish.

Tuesday, 29 January 2008

Question 5: Good luck or good management? Part One.

What are the chances that something as amazing as you or me could randomly appear in the universe?


What are the chances that a planet capable of supporting life should happen to exist in the universe? What are the chances that the unlikely combination of events that science asserts caused life to errupt should happen spontanteously on such a planet? What are the chances that random mutation and natural selection should lead from that initial simple life to something as sophisticated as the human race? Is it not true that the scientific model of how mankind came to be is just incredibly complicated and convoluted? Is it not much more likely that there is a simple and clean explanation involving a conscious creator?


Is simple always better?


Albert Einstein had a strong conviction that a good model should be a simple and elegant model: if an explanation for something is too complicated then you have probably got it wrong. But there is no scientific justification for this, it is a personal preference or prejudice. Models in physics that Einstein disliked because they were not elegant have turned out to be highly useful and long-lived models. Our preference for simple explanations may be a property of our brains, not a requirement on the universe in general.


We also need to be aware of things that appear very complex but are actually very simple. Anybody who has had a computer with a screen saver is likely to have come across Conway's Game of Life. A relatively complicated and seemingly unpredictable pattern of moving shapes based upon four very simple rules. And this is not a contrived mathematical curiosity; this is a common feature of scientific models ranging from the movement of minute particles to the growing patterns of plants to the logic in the brains of simple creatures and beyond. Simple rules lead to complicated results.


Just how unlikely is unlikely?

In one of the diversions I mentioned the double-edged sword of intuition. One area where intuition can be extremely unhelpful is probability and coincidence.

Experiment has shown that people are generally very bad at judging the relative likelihood of things. For example, if I were to toss a normal coin, which of the two following sequences is more unlikely?

  1) heads tails tails heads tails heads tails
2) heads heads heads heads heads heads heads
Or if I were to pick letters entirely at random, which of the following two sequences is more unlikely?

  a) yrqwburix
b) hellodave
Most people without a basic training in probability will say that sequence (2) and sequence (b) are more unlikely. Hitting a string of seven heads in a row feels unlikely. Randomly generating a recognisable phrase feels unlikely. In fact, in both examples the sequences have exactly the same probability of occuring. If you don't believe this, that is intuition messing with you. It's powerful stuff.

So ... just because a thing seems intuitively unlikely, that does not make it unlikely. You have to take a step back and examine the thing objectively using science.

"What are the chances that a planet capable of supporting life should happen to exist in the universe?"

Likelihood depends broadly on two things: how uncommon the thing is, and how big the sample is. As an everyday example: if one person buys a lottery ticket they are unlikely to win. If several million people buy lottery tickets, one of them is quite likely to win. Most lotteries eventually have a winner.

Lemma: The universe is big.

Very very very big. Our sun is part of the milky way (the vague band of light that you can see in the sky if you live somewhere with a low level of man-made light). The current best estimate for the number of other stars in the milky way is around two trillion (2,000,000,000,000). And the milky way is one of (again at a best estimate) around half a trillion (500,000,000,000) galaxies. A ballpark estimate for the total number of stars in the universe is a septillion (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000). The sun is one of a septillion stars.

A septillion is a great word but not really a number that a human brain can grasp intuitively so let us examine it another way. There are roughly six billion people on the planet. There are an average of 100 thousand hairs (or hair follicles if they're bald) on each of their heads. Now imagine cutting every single one of those hairs into a thousand pieces. There are still around one and a half million stars for every tiny chopped piece of every single hair on every human head on earth. Speaking for myself, I struggle to intuitively grasp six billion people, let alone the hairs on their heads. A septillion is a staggeringly big number.

The random appearance of human beings seems intuitively unlikely. But the universe is even more unintuitively gigantic. So again ... you have to put intuition to one side and attempt to grapple with this subject objectively with science.